Church safeguarding increasingly speaks not only of minors, but also of vulnerable adults. Fr Kevin Schembri, academic, canon lawyer, and member of the Safeguarding Commission Review Board, explores why the term is so important and not as simple as it first appears.
The term “vulnerability” has become increasingly familiar in the Church’s norms and laws on safeguarding. Today, we speak not only of protecting “minors” or “persons who habitually have an imperfect use of reason”, but also of safeguarding “vulnerable persons” or “vulnerable adults”. Yet what exactly do we mean when we use these terms?
In recent years, the language of vulnerability has appeared in various Church documents on safeguarding. For instance, Pope Francis used the term “vulnerable adults” in his 2014 chirograph establishing the Pontifical Commission for the Protection of Minors and in his 2016 apostolic letter As a Loving Mother, on the possibility of removal from ecclesiastical office for grave reasons.
However, a legal definition of the term was introduced only in 2019. In Law no. CCXCVII of Vatican City State, entitled On the Protection of Minors and Vulnerable Persons, and in the first version of Vos Estis Lux Mundi, Pope Francis opted for the term “vulnerable persons” and defined such persons as those “in a state of infirmity, physical or mental deficiency, or deprivation of personal liberty which, in fact, even occasionally, limits their ability to understand or to want or otherwise resist the offence.”
Despite this important development, when the section of the Code of Canon Law concerning canonical crimes and penal sanctions was revised in 2021, the new version avoided any reference to “vulnerable” subjects. The Dicastery for Legislative Texts later explained that the expression had been avoided because it referred to a notion “not yet well-defined or doctrinally shared in the broad ambit in which canon law is in force.”
By contrast, the revised Vos Estis Lux Mundi of 2023 used the term again. This time, however, Francis reverted to the use of “vulnerable adult” rather than “vulnerable person” and distinguished the category of the “vulnerable adult” from that of “a person who habitually has imperfect use of reason”. The revised law, however, retained the same definition introduced in 2019.
I mention these recent developments to highlight both the evolving nature and the complexity of the terminology. At the same time, they also reflect a growing awareness in the Church that attention cannot be directed solely towards the conduct of the person accused of abuse, but must also take into account the conditions and circumstances of the person who may be harmed. Moreover, when considering the person who may be harmed, safeguarding cannot focus only on minors or persons who habitually have an imperfect use of reason, but must also extend to other vulnerable adults.
Vulnerability should not be equated solely with an intrinsic or permanent characteristic of a particular person or group, but also depends on a person’s practical circumstances, especially those that may limit their ability to understand, exercise their freedom, or resist an offence. This becomes especially important in contexts of dependency, authority, and imbalances of power, even though the existence of such contexts does not, in itself, necessarily make a person legally vulnerable.
Beyond determining who falls within a particular legal category, the Church is called always to show particular concern for weak and defenceless persons, whose freedom and dignity must be respected and protected by all.
For a recent exploration of this topic, see John Paul Kimes, “The Concept of ‘Vulnerable Person’ in the Current Law of the Church: Current Challenges and Future Proposals,” The Jurist 82 (2026): 1-60.